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Introduction  
In the trawl of an ongoing evolution and constant development of international commerce, as new 
disputes arise, the dispute resolution systems must keep evolving on the same pace. As ‘one of the 
most powerful influences on human activity is the driving force of trade’1, it is no surprise the importance 
it has on the legal world, and why dispute resolution systems flourish at the pace of trade. Assuredly, 
arbitration has been gaining strength and popularity in the international sphere, and thus new dilemmas 
are being discussed for the concrete solidification of the modern system, as much as in terms of 
legislation, jurisprudence, and practice. And it has been, following the same pattern of trade growth, 
England been setting pace and tone on arbitration matters, having the the London Court of Arbitration, 
one of the leading international institutions for commercial dispute resolution, were for the year of 2018, 
317 cases were filed2. 
 
‘Rapidly changing global economy generates increasingly complex trade relations involving parties 
from different parts of the globe’.3 Certainly, traditional litigation has fallen behind the needs of the 
modern world, were companies seek more flexible, faster, and cheaper solutions to solve their disputes. 
In contrast, traditional litigation has been stagnant in rigid and costly processes, thus a current disincline 
on favouring such alternative. Not only these elements have made arbitration an attractive alternative, 
but has also been the privacy additive that it offers. It is the flexible nature of arbitration, that fuse 
together common and civil law, where parties are granted the principle of autonomy (being the party 
autonomy the hallmark principle), and thus, find an oasis to treat disputes with parties’ that are not from 
the same country, speak same language, culture or have the same judicial system. ‘Indeed the first and 
foremost principle of law in commercial arbitration is that it is founded on the autonomy of the parties’ 
will’.4 Moreover, in a downside, it has been an escape from the scrutiny of the public eye, as the system 
is far more discreet and private, allowing to keep trade secrets and sensitive information to be accessed 
publicly as it is in court proceedings.  
                                                 
1 Roy Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edition, Penguin Books, 2004) 3 
2 London Court of Arbitration, ‘2018 Annual Casework Report’ (LCIA, 2018) <https://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx> accessed 
18 June 2019 
3 Zlatanzka E, ‘To Publish or not to Publish: That is the Question’ (2015) Intl J of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 
25 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2558743> accessed 14 August 2019 29 
4 Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2012) 12 
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Nevertheless, it has been this element of privacy, that has been coined as a cloak of secrecy for 
modern arbitrations. As companies and trade evolve and shift into a trend of openness, arbitration must 
follow. Similarly, arbitration has also been classified as confidential, wrongly granting the same value 
and protection as privacy, even when they are different items or elements to considerate from 
arbitration. ‘Viewed from afar, there seems to exist a perception that arbitration is a confidential process; 
yet, upon closer inspection, few legal concepts are more indefinite in nature, dubious in scope and 
uncertain in existence than confidentiality’.5 
 
On the other hand, amongst other demands of the modern world, open justice stemmed in 
transparency, impose a threat to the element of confidentiality, and have pressured its way to stir the 
discussion in national and international courts and forums. Admittedly, the world does not seem to agree 
on the matter as to where does arbitration stands on the duty of confidentiality, thus, legislation has 
remained silent or been rather ambiguous, and for those countries that have openly addressed the 
matter, different guidelines on what is the right way to follow are being presented. And the biggest 
issues seem to revolve around that unfortunately, the privacy and confidentiality elements of arbitration 
have been confused by secrecy. The opinions of judges, scholars, and even companies, have remained 
strongly divided.  
 
Assuredly, various nations have taken different postures on how to address the duty of 
confidentiality, whilst in common law systems case law has been of major importance on guiding the 
course of such, as well as international and institutional guidelines. Additional uncertainties arise as 
there is not a uniform international code that address the matter, but it should also be borne in mind 
that the challenge to arbitral confidentiality may reflect a communitarian need for public debate and 
scrutiny of justice determination.6 For a long time, it was commonly held that as there was privacy, 
confidentiality came automatically in an absolute sense, however, this is now being replaced with a new 
way of thinking.7  
                                                 
5 Ileana M. Smeureanu, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2011) 189 
6 Kyriaki Noussia, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 134 and 139 
7 Bernardo M. Cremades and Rodrigo Cortes, ‘The Principle of Confidentiality in Arbitration: A Necessary Crisis’ (2013) vol.23 J 
of Arb Studies 25 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jarbstu23&collection=journals&id=415&startid=415&endid=428> 
accessed 17 June 2019 28 
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The objective of this paper is to critically discuss and examine the principle of confidentiality in 
International Commercial Arbitration, questioning to what extent is it limited (if it is) and how it translates 
into practice on the modern world, thus, addressing the controversial element of transparency. The 
latter from a comparative perspective in the adaption of international instruments and legal precedents 
in England, Australia and Mexico, two common law countries but with different approaches and a civil 
system that is young on this matter. As for the methodology of this paper, a black letter or doctrinal 
approach will be followed, analysing legal precedents and engaging in a critique to existing legislation 
in order to conclude with the optimal approach proposal. Furthermore, an evaluation of the current 
practice will be addressed. After an accurate evaluation of the principle of confidentiality, this paper 
seeks to propose the optimal approach and pathway for emerging arbitration practices, specially taking 
into consideration the needs of the modern world. It will also be argued that and international 
confidentiality framework is very much needed. ‘Confidentiality should not, in any event be synonymous 
with secrecy’.8 
 
Such analysis will be accompanied with the examination of legislation and case law, discussing the 
interest in the disclosure of information. In order to stand out said concerns, the paper will be divided 
into chapters. The first chapter will address the conceptualisation of confidentiality, by which the nature 
of arbitration, the agreement to arbitrate and the advantages of said mechanism will be explored. The 
second chapter will address diverse approaches on the principle of confidentiality, within the scope of 
international regulations, such as the ICC, LCIA, ACICA, UNCITRAL and ICSID, as well as a national 
approach of England, Australia and Mexico. For the third chapter, having a concrete concept on said 
principle, its scope will be thoroughly explored, especially on its limitations or exceptions. For the fourth 
chapter, a major critique to the ongoing risks of confidentiality will be evaluated, in sync with the first 
chapter, unveiling the cloak of secrecy, followed by the current trend towards transparency and open 
justice. Having explored the exceptions, for chapter five arbitration as a cloak of secrecy will be 
explored. Derived from these appreciations, the modern approach towards transparency will be touched 
upon in the sixth chapter. Finally, all things considered, final remarks on the optimal approach on the 
                                                 
8 Bernardo M. Cremades and Rodrigo Cortes, ‘The Principle of Confidentiality in Arbitration: A Necessary Crisis’ (2013) vol.23 J 
of Arb Studies 25 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jarbstu23&collection=journals&id=415&startid=415&endid=428> 
accessed 17 June 2019 33 
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principle of confidentiality will be included, as a proposal for setting a pathway for the evolving 
international legislation, analysing the risks and benefits of a new transparency or limits. This paper 
proposes that even when there are different opinions on the matter, developing and international 
framework will ease controversies as for the duty of confidentiality.  
 
Chapter I – Defining the indefinable: Principle of confidentiality  
The main issue on matters of confidentiality is defining which elements fall under the confidentiality 
umbrella, from where can such duty arise, to what extent do elements remain confidential, who are 
subject of the duty, and what are the exceptions. It is setting this base on what is confidentiality that 
creates a snowball effect that leads to different approaches by diverse judges, legislations and 
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, in order to define confidentiality, and must importantly, its context within 
International Commercial Arbitration, it is important to explore the roots and principles of arbitration. In 
this section it is going to be discussed about arbitration in general terms, the agreement to arbitrate, the 
advantages of arbitration and the conceptualisation of principle of confidentiality, including a 
comparison with privacy. 
 
a) Arbitration  
The origins of arbitration rest in lex mercatoria as it set the framework for the rules of trade, thus, 
customary rules and practices were incorporated to the legal culture of emerging States, ultimately 
providing the base of the current International Commerce Arbitration.9 Even when there is no legal 
definition for arbitration and national laws do not attempt to define it, as it is a dynamic dispute resolution 
mechanism varying according to law and international practice, it is must certain in has some 
advantages over traditional litigation.10 In general terms, arbitration is a private method of settling 
disputes based on the agreement between parties, whereby the settlement of a question is entrusted 
to a person [arbitrator] who derive their powers from a private agreement, not from the authorities of a 
                                                 
9 Gábor Szalay, ‘Arbitration and Transparency – Relations Between a Private Environment and a Fundamental Requirement’ 
(LLM International Business Law Master’s Thesis, Tilburg University 2019) 7 
10 Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2012) 12 
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State, who proceed and decide the case on the basis of such agreement.11 In spite of having origin from 
a private agreement, arbitration has public legal effects, hence, needs the support of the public 
(national) legal system.12 ‘Through a highly complex interaction, national legal systems and international 
conventions combine to provide the framework within which international arbitration is conducted’.13  
‘The judicial character of arbitration [arbitrators perform their judicial role by making an award] 
allows it to be distinguished from other mechanism, such as conciliation, mediation, settlement and 
expert proceedings’.14 It is in arbitration, and through the judicial role of arbitrators, that decisions 
culminate on being binding on the parties, one of the main attractions to use arbitration, specially when 
the dispute arises between parties of different countries (meaning, different jurisdictions).15 As a side 
note, disputes solved over traditional litigation may face the problem not only of the enforceability of the 
decision, but even to treat the dispute itself, as laws vary between countries, it is common to find barriers 
or legal loops that do not guarantee the protection and validation of the parties’ rights. As there is not a 
‘supra-national judiciary with mandatory jurisdiction, arbitration enhances a relative measure of 
adjudicatory neutrality, which in turn promotes respect for shared ex ante expectations at the time of a 
contract or investment’16. 
‘Globalization has contributed directly to the rapid and broad growth of international arbitration’17, 
and over the years it has grown to be the preferred mechanism of dispute resolution by companies (in 
contrast with mediation, as well as with traditional litigation), this is why it is said commercial arbitration 
is a by-product of economic globalisation18, thus, it is heavily influenced by neoliberal concepts of 
economic relations with a strong emphasis on markets, deregulation and free international trade and 
investment19. The value of arbitration over litigation includes a wide range of advantages, such as 
                                                 
11 Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999) 
9 and 10 
12 Christian Bühring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business (Kluwer Law International 2006) 42 
13 ibid 42 
14 Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999) 
12 
15 ibid 12 
16 William W. Park, ‘Arbitrators and Accuracy’ (2010) vol.1 JIDS 25 <https://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/4/28144731194383/media012771033387160ww_park_accuracy_and_arbitration.pdf> accessed 24 June 2019 
33 
17 Kyriaki Noussia, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 127 
18 Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999) 
295 
19 Isabel Corona, ‘Confidentiality at risk: The interdiscursive construction of International Commercial Arbitration’ (2011) Discourse 
and Communication 355 <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1750481311418097?journalCode=dcma> accessed 30 
September 2019 356 
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greater party autonomy, greater predictability of the applicable governing law, greater efficiency in terms 
of both money and time, greater certainty of the forum in which the dispute will be heard and of relevant 
jurisdictional issues, and a greater ability to enforce the resulting decision in foreign countries.20 This is 
of ultimate importance to transnational and/or multinational companies, where there is a difference in 
jurisdiction, language and culture, thus, arbitration ensure their rights to be protected and validated. In 
light of the above, international companies have turned more and more to arbitration, and this 
development in the last decade may be explained by the fact that no other system for the settlement of 
disputes could meet so effectively the needs of parties to international contracts, and in particular, their 
needs for neutrality and effectiveness, two important attributes of arbitration.21 
b) Agreement to arbitrate  
In arbitration the party autonomy, or principle of freedom of contract, the primary rule that governs the 
law, practice and regulation of arbitration in the vast majority of national jurisdictions, allows the parties 
to write their own set of rules of arbitration.22 ‘At one end, it is held that party autonomy is founded on 
the contract and need not to be justified by any legal system’.23 In this sense, arbitration is born (its 
mere possibility to exist) from an agreement to arbitrate, and it is this contract that is considered as 
foundation stone of International Commercial Arbitration, as it records the consent of the parties to 
submit to arbitration.24 ‘In commercial arbitration the contractual character of arbitration is undisputed’.25 
In other words, the arbitration agreement is the basis of any consensual arbitration, so that there cannot 
be an arbitral reference in the absence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.26  
 
The principle of party autonomy is recognised by international and national law, and for the 
case of English law27, freedom of contract rests in its main core. ‘Assuming ex hypothesi that 
confidentiality is not an obligatory feature of arbitration, but rather a contractual creation, the logical 
                                                 
20 Hillind H, ‘A Difficult Balance: Open Justice and the Protection of Confidentiality in Arbitration Related Court Proceedings’ 
(2015) Victoria U of Wellington Legal Research Papers <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817595> accessed 12 August 2019 1 
21 Derains Y, ‘New Trends in the Practical Application of the ICC Rules of Arbitration’ (1981) Nw J Intl L & Bus 39 
<https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=10
89&context=njilb> accessed 14 August 2019 40 
22 Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2012) 12 
23 Abdulhay Sayed, Corruption in International Trade and Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2004) 163 
24 Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2012) 13 
25 ibid 81 
26 Emilia Onyema, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrator’s Contract (Routledge 2010) 8 
27 Note: The freedom of contract principle is of utter importance under English commercial law and as seen by case law, it provides 
the source for any particular case. 
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conclusion is that the parties may, by agreement, limit their scope of confidentiality.’28 With this in mind, 
the syllogism is clear: ‘if confidentiality can be agreed, then there is no presumption of confidentiality, 
ergo, if there is no presumption of confidentiality then it is not essential’29, hence, following the principle 
of freedom of contract.  
 
As for the international legislation, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (herein after referred to as the New York Convention) recalls in its Article 
II(1) that each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration.30 Likewise, said Convention also mentions under its Article V(1)(a) 
that recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, if the parties to the agreement, under 
the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to 
which the parties have subjected it.31 Here, the importance of written agreements is highlighted, an they 
serve as source for the proceeding to be held; this will come in handy when addressing the duty of 
confidentiality. Above all, it is important to clarify that the Convention is the most significant legislative 
instrument for treaty-based arbitration, although its rules are also present on International Commercial 
Arbitration.32 Then as well, said Convention contains no provision for confidentiality in arbitral 
proceedings, but instead focuses on the enforcement and recognition of arbitral awards and 
agreements.33 Although, it may ‘potentially support an implied requirement to give effect to parties’ 
agreements with regard to confidentiality in Articles II(1) and II(3)’34. 
 
Similarly, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) states under its first article that the scope of said 
legislation applies to agreements between States, followed by a definition of an arbitration agreement 
                                                 
28 Ileana M. Smeureanu, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2011) 112 
29 Bernardo M. Cremades and Rodrigo Cortes, ‘The Principle of Confidentiality in Arbitration: A Necessary Crisis’ (2013) vol.23 
J of Arb Studies 25 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jarbstu23&collection=journals&id=415&startid=415&endid=428> 
accessed 17 June 2019 28 
30 New York Convention Article II(1) 
31 ibid Article V(1)(a) 
32 Avinash Poorooye and Ronán Feehily, ‘Confidentiality and Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration: Finding the 
Right Balance’ (2017) Harvard Negotiation L Rev 275 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/haneg22&div=12&id=&page> accessed 30 September 2019 
279 
33 ibid 280 
34 Henry Hillind, ‘A Difficult Balance: Open Justice and the Protection of Confidentiality in Arbitration Related Court Proceedings’ 
(2015) Victoria U of Wellington Legal Research Papers <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817595> accessed 12 August 2019 4 
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which is one by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which 
may arise, including that it may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a 
separate agreement.35 Additionally, it states under its Article 36(1)(a)(i) that the recognition or 
enforcement may be refused if the arbitration agreement is void.36 It is then clear the importance of an 
agreement to arbitrate and how it may be manifested, whether an arbitration clause contracted in 
another contract before a dispute or as a submission agreement after a dispute has arisen.37 ‘The fact 
that the basis of arbitration is contractual is not disputed: an arbitrator’s power to resolve a dispute is 
founded upon the common intention of the parties to that dispute’.38 In essence, the agreement to 
arbitration holds a lot of power to set the course for how the arbitration is going to be developed. And it 
its by this contractual nature of arbitration, that the terms, whether implied or express, are of vital 
importance when it comes to the duty of confidentiality.  
 
c) Advantages of arbitration  
Assuredly, there are benefits from arbitration over traditional litigation, and in order to understand the 
duties imposed by arbitration proceedings, it is valuable to evaluate the reason that lead to take this 
alternate dispute resolution. On a first instance, its neutrality, meaning that when parties being from 
different countries, would not need to face the issue of foreign law, and more importantly, are given an 
opportunity to participate in the selection of the tribunal, and it is important to keep in mind (as well, as 
y following common sense), parties will prefer an arbitrator (or arbitrators) with sufficient experience 
and expertise, although within a strict scope of confidentiality, parties may lack to have the background 
or predictability of a certain arbitration. Secondly, the enforcement, as the decision issued as an award 
is binding.39 These, make arbitration an attractive and cheaper dispute resolution system, offering 
flexibility as it may be tailored to meet the specific requirements of the dispute.40 If a survey was to be 
conducted results would include advantages of speed and flexibility of the process; lower cost; greater 
                                                 
35 UNCITRAL Model Law Article 7(1) 
36 ibid Article 36(1)(a)(i) 
37 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edition, Oxford University Press, 2009) 15 
38 Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999) 
29 
39 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edition, Oxford University Press, 2009) 32 
40 ibid 33 
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guarantee of settlement due to the specialisation of the arbitrators (as opposed to civil judges); and the 
possibility of continuity of the commercial relationship between the disputing parties.41  
 
Furthermore, arbitration offers confidentiality as a form of privacy in the arbitral proceedings, and it 
‘is a powerful attraction to companies and institutions that may become involved (often against their 
will) in legal proceedings’42, as they may be protected from disclosing their trade secrets or to generate 
a bad image for the company that may put at risk its performance. ‘The thought that confidentiality is 
an innate attribute, seems to be an attractiveness considered to choose international commercial 
arbitration to settle disputes’43, thus it is preferred over other dispute settlements. Nonetheless, the 
“innate attribute” has been questioned, creating broad spectrums of what is to be expected from 
arbitration and confidentiality.  
 
Moreover, Queen Mary University of London made in 2010 their International Arbitration Survey: 
Choices in International Arbitration, which brought up important opinions of corporations, concluding as 
the hallmark attribution to choose arbitration to be flexibility. As for the lack of confidentiality in State 
court litigation, 62% of the corporate counsels interviewed denied this was a principal reason for 
choosing arbitration, although confidentiality is not seen as essential, it was declared very important, 
must specifically regarding the amount (monetary terms) of the arbitration.44 However, it is noteworthy 
that corporations are often obliged to report to shareholders, make disclosures in their annual accounts 
and reports and otherwise announce significant information to the market (in the case of publicly listed 
companies).45 ‘Corporate counsel accept that this can make confidentiality ‘porous’, but a number said 
that often commercial arbitration matters are not of great interest to outsiders and do not involve 
                                                 
41 Bernardo M. Cremades and Rodrigo Cortes, ‘The Principle of Confidentiality in Arbitration: A Necessary Crisis’ (2013) vol.23 
J of Arb Studies 25 
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jarbstu23&collection=journals&id=415&startid=415&endid=428> 
accessed 17 June 2019 26 
42 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edition, Oxford University Press, 2009) 33 
43 Marlon Meza Salas, “Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration: Truth or Fiction?” (Wolters Kluwer, 23 September 
2018) <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/09/23/confidentiality-in-international-commercial-arbitration-truth-or-
fiction/> 
44 White & Case, ‘2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in International Arbitration’ (Queen Mary University of London, 
2010) <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf> accessed 17 
June 2019 
45 Alberto Malatesta and Rinaldo Sali, The Rise of Transparency in International Arbitration (Juris 2013) and White & Case, ‘2010 
International Arbitration Survey: Choices in International Arbitration’ (Queen Mary University of London, 2010) 
<http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf> accessed 17 June 
2019 
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sensitive commercial information’.46 Consequently, a full and strict confidentiality is not viable for the 
modern corporate governance. Following these findings, the Survey presented the corporations the 
scenario if they would still use arbitration if it did not offer the potential for confidentiality, the results 
were that 38% said they would still use it, 35% said they would not, and 26% don’t know.47 It then may 
be concluded from this study that confidentiality is highly important but not the only reason parties use 
arbitration, and specially, that said attribute is not an absolute one.  
 
In like manner, but most recent, the Queen Mary University of London 2018 International Arbitration 
Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration, identified confidentiality is not at the top priority, 
following the open justice tendency of companies (followed in fifth place by “confidentiality and privacy” 
with 35%).48 Albeit, both surveys included that 50% of respondents erroneously believe that arbitration 
is confidential even where there is no specific clause to that effect in the arbitration rules adopted or the 
arbitration agreement, whilst only 30% do not consider it confidential.49 Additionally, ‘a decisive majority 
of 74% of the respondent group believed that confidentiality should be an opt-out feature while only 
26% thought that confidentiality should not be presumed by default’.50 Recalling the contractual nature 
of arbitration, rested in party autonomy, it is not out of line to consider an “opt-out, opt-in” mechanism. 
In essence, the surveys from Queen Mary University of London reflect that confidentiality is not the 
single biggest driver behind the choice of arbitration by the parties who use it.51 Similarly, although not 
as recent, but it is a change that has been happening on this millennium, a 2008 study from 
PricewaterhouseCoopers reveals that confidentiality ranks low as the most important attribute of 
arbitration, so it is once again the enforceability of the awards, flexibility of procedures and expertise of 
arbitrators that are seen as the major advantages of arbitration.52  
 
 
                                                 
46 White & Case, ‘2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in International Arbitration’ (Queen Mary University of London, 
2010) <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf> accessed 17 
June 2019 
47 ibid  
48 White & Case, ‘2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration’ (Queen Mary University of 
London, 2018) <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-Arbitration-Survey-report.pdf> 
accessed 17 June 2019 
49 ibid 
50 ibid 
51 ibid 
52 Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999) 
284 
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d) Conceptualisation of confidentiality  
The issue revolves around the idea that confidentiality is traditionally considered almost part and parcel 
of arbitration, thus, it will be expected that arbitral regulation, in national laws and international 
institutional regulation, to be  quite clear in this regard, however, that is far from reality.53 Even if 
unwritten, there was an assumption that the private nature of the arbitral proceedings obliged to 
maintain confidentiality.54 This comes as a result of the transformation of the notion of confidentiality, a 
debate that stirs up even more in the modern and present era. ‘Until the 1990s there was a belief that 
arbitration proceeding were both private and confidential, and that the duty of confidentiality arose from 
the very nature of arbitration’.55 However, there were a number of cases and new trend in international 
policies, as well as a demand from a new generation of practitioners, that stated to question this duality 
of privacy and confidentiality, thus, diverse criteria (and quite opposite) were formed.  
 
Two main approaches are to be found: while in England the approach has been of an implied duty 
of confidentiality, the Australian approach has been on the contrary quite reluctant to an implied, thus 
take the approach on an express duty of confidentiality.56 ‘The existence and scope of confidentiality in 
arbitration spawn debate first before national courts, when parties sought to reveal and rely on 
arbitration materials in subsequent proceedings’57. Taken for granted for many years, the English courts 
who assumed that arbitrations were private and confidential58, took notice of the current controversy 
around privacy and confidentiality, which became visible in 1984 with the case of Oxford Shipping v 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha [1984], as it was in this case that it was questioned whether arbitrators could 
order concurrent hearings in parallel arbitrations before the same arbitrators59, followed by other cases 
such as the Dolling-Baker v Merrett [1990]. And it was by the case of Esso Australia Resources Ltd v 
The Honourable Sidney James Plowman [1995] that originates the modern view of a distinction between 
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privacy and confidentiality, as it bravely recognised that privacy of hearings and confidentiality could go 
on separate ways, as independent elements or items.60  
 
First things first, it important to define what is confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration. 
In broad terms and a generic etymological definition, it ‘refers to non-disclosure of specific information 
in public’61. It is important to make the difference between the "private character" and "confidentiality" 
in international arbitration, where confidentiality acts as a more restrictive notion, referring to the 
disclosure of certain documents, information or evidence to third parties in connection to the arbitral 
proceeding.62 As to what elements fall under the confidentiality umbrella, ‘confidentiality is concerned 
with information relating to the content of the proceedings, evidence and documents, addresses, 
transcripts of the hearing or the award’63. It is then that confidentiality bifurcate into different items or 
instances to be protected.  
 
Initially, the subjects that are held to the duty of confidentiality. In essence, the actors that have the 
potential obligation to compel to said duty are the parties involved, the representatives of the parties 
(external attorneys or in-house lawyers), the arbitral tribunal, more specifically the arbitrator, the arbitral 
institutions, and third parties participating in the proceedings, such as witnesses.64  Nonetheless, from 
these categories, it may be extracted that only ‘the arbitrators and the legal counsel representing the 
parties before the arbitral tribunal have, as part of their deontological duties65, an obligation to maintain 
confidentiality regarding the information circulated in the process of dispute resolution’66. Indeed, 
confidentiality is more regulated in terms of internal administration, as arbitrators and staff of the 
arbitration centre follow rules from the codes of ethics, even when they do not include a section for the 
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parties67. The LCIA Rules include under its Article 30(2) that the deliberations of the Arbitral Tribunal 
shall remain confidential to its members, to the extent that arbitrators may not disclose details from their 
cases.68 The problem falls within the duty from the parties themselves, but it is not only if they have 
such duty or not, it is important to comprehend what elements falls under the veil of confidentiality.  
 
Furthermore, similar to the banker’s confidentiality69, arbitrators are also subject to some exceptions 
that allow (or even more, request) disclosure of information. Such circumstances include money 
laundering, fraud, tax evasion (and tax havens), bribery, corruption and other offences. As an 
illustration, under English law, regarding money laundering, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 states on 
its Section 328 that ‘a person [the arbitrator] commits an offence if he becomes concerned in an 
arrangement which he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use 
or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person’70. Thankfully, Section 327(2) provides 
relief as it allows the to disclose information if has an appropriate consent (from the parties) or has a 
reasonable excuse.71 It is fair to say that there has been no precedent on the matter and it is definitely 
not included on the relevant legislation. Nevertheless, it is once more appreciated the importance of the 
terms agreed in the contract, as an expressed authorization (as in a clause speculating a possible 
event) will be sufficient to act and follow the compulsion of law. 
 
In this sense, the main controversy on the matter is regarding the confidentiality of the documents 
presented and/or produced in the hearings. ‘Analysed in abstracto, unlike privacy, confidentiality is a 
state of secrecy attached to the materials created, presented and used in the context of the arbitral 
process’.72  
 
Also, it is important to draw a comparison with privacy. Privacy and confidentiality shall be appraised 
as two different elements, as privacy does not equal confidentiality, being such not an essential element 
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to arbitration. Notably, there is a difference then with privacy and confidentiality. Where the first remains 
exclusive to the hearings (as for the third parties that may have access and observe the proceedings, 
which are private not public), and in opposition, confidentiality is linked to the possibility to disclose 
documents and information used or related to the arbitration, as well as the award or existence of 
arbitration itself.73 Privacy ‘confers the power to exclude others form arbitration, whereas confidentiality 
may impose an obligation to prevent the disclosure of information about the arbitration and documents 
created or produced in the arbitration’74. Also, privacy does not relate to the arbitral process as a whole 
but only to the hearings phase.75 In contrast, confidentiality bifurcates into “items” protected or capable 
of protection, reaching further in the proceedings, extending also to the pre and post hearing phases.76 
Furthermore, ‘it serves to centralise the parties dispute in a single forum and to facilitate an objective, 
efficient and commercially-sensible resolution of the dispute’77. Privacy and confidentiality may overlap 
in the context of hearings, but this does not necessarily mean that all information disclosed at the stage 
is confidential; at best, the information disclosed in the hearings is only presumptively confidential. 
 
It is then that arbitration is private but not confidential, a paradox that it is seemingly contradictory, 
but  not correct to assume that information revealed in arbitration is automatically confidential.78 Then 
again, a comparison must be drawn between both concepts. Privacy does not relate to the arbitral 
process as a whole, but only to the hearings phase, and it is common that the general rules is that 
hearings are private unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.79 Finally, the publication of the 
awards is another element to be considered to be prospect under the veil of confidentiality and that has 
generated an uproar in international regulations. Although, this will be fully addressed in subsequent 
sections. As for the mere existence of an arbitration, as it will be explained in detail in the next section, 
it is widely accepted, specially when institutional arbitration is the way to go.  
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e) Final remarks 
In essence, it is true there is a difference between confidentiality and privacy, although there was a 
common misconception that they were synonyms or that the private character or hearings meant an 
absolute confidentiality or prohibition to disclose documents from such proceeding. Nonetheless, even 
when there are different elements fall under the confidentiality umbrella, it may be concluded that they 
stem from the same origin: the contractual nature of arbitration. Notwithstanding the latter, as it will be 
seen, there are some exceptions that lift the veil, and it is this criterion that has been slowly forming, 
conceptualising the scope and limits to confidentiality.  
 
Chapter II – Approach on the principle of confidentiality 
As it was previously mentioned, there are diverse approaches on confidentiality, as much as in 
international rules and national laws. Most international rules say very little about the extent to which 
arbitral proceedings are confidential, while national laws and national courts have taken varying stances 
on the matter and new developments, such as the rise of investor-state arbitration where public interest 
has brought pressure for greater transparency, are having a transformative influence on traditional 
thinking about confidentiality.80 In other words, arbitration statutes and rules of commercial arbitration 
do not include provisions establishing confidentiality requirements.81 For this section, a review of the 
most relevant international rules will be addressed, followed by national legislation resting in case law 
law, specifically of England and Australia, and finalising with an approach from an emerging legislation 
on arbitration, Mexico. 
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a) International regulations  
‘In the absence of any international state court, arbitration has become the dominant means for solving 
the disputes of international trade.’82 Consequently, the number of cases submitted to arbitration is 
increasing dramatically, specially during the most recent years.83 It is noteworthy that the more 
complicated a dispute is, the more challenging is going to find the right case management tools.84 
Granted that, arbitration institutions must adapt themselves to the modern needs and to successfully 
meet the demands of the number of cases filed. With the growing popularity of arbitration, it is becoming 
increasingly rare for the parties to choose their arbitrators and organize their procedure directly, even 
when the freedom of contract is the rule. ‘Instead, permanent arbitral institutions have been set up 
throughout the world and now handle the vast majority of ICA’.85 The institutionalisation of arbitration 
seeks for stability and a uniform practice and regulations. ‘Perhaps the most important advantage of 
institutional arbitration is a certain measure of convenience, security and administrative effectiveness’.86  
 
Equally important, institutional arbitration has the advantage of the prestige and the track record 
that strengthen the credibility of awards, therefore, facilitates both voluntary compliance and 
enforcement.87 ‘In a more connected world, multinational companies are spawning and international 
commercial contracts are blooming’.88 Notably, there is increased competition between arbitral 
institutions, arbitrators, and lawyers derived from the increasing popularity and pressures for 
homogenous rules, but thankfully, this fierce competition has also led to increased cooperation in a bid 
to improve the arbitration system, following the demands of the modern world and trade system, highly 
motivated by transparency, as it is going to be deepened in coming sections.89 However, problems arise 
as there with the constantly growing number of arbitral institutions, each of which has different rules 
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and processes, which will be a potential risk, specially taking into consideration the publication of 
awards and that companies turn to smaller arbitration institutions that do not follow transparency 
policies.90 With this in mind, it is important to evaluate the rules of the major arbitration institutions and 
international rules.  
 
a.1) International Court of Arbitration   
Firstly, the International Court of Arbitration (herein after referred to as ICC) is the arbitral body attached 
to the International Chamber of Commerce that was established in 1919, and it is considered to be the 
leading international arbitral institution in terms of volume of cases and the significance of disputes 
heard91, as well as it is considered ‘one of the must venerable arbitral institutions’92. The ICC ‘is by far 
the most preferred arbitral institution — in particular for high-value, complex, international disputes – 
due to its unique track record, global reach and signature quality control’.93 Notably, since 2016, the 
ICC has shifted into a more transparent direction, welcoming policies to further improve efficiency, 
diversity and transparency. As said by Alexander Fressas, the Secretary General of the ICC: ‘We are 
pleased to see increased participation from arbitrators in growing economic regions’.94  
 
Since 2016, the ICC has adopted a new and modern approach enhancing the efficiency and 
transparency of arbitration proceedings, thus, it has implemented new policies for such purpose. Such 
decisions were unanimously adopted at the Bureau of the Court and announced at the Court’s Plenary 
session on December 17, 2015.95 Following this new approach, the ICC has now been publishing since 
2016 on its website the names of the arbitrators sitting in cases, including their nationalities, as for the 
case itself, the name of the parties will not be disclosed; nonetheless, parties may opt out of this limited 
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disclosure by mutual agreement, or may request the Court to publish additional information about a 
particular case. As for 2019, the ICC has continued on its efforts to promote transparency policies and 
enhance efficiency. In this sense, following the previous policies of 2016, the ICC has updated their 
Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of Arbitration under the ICC Rules of Arbitration 
(the Note), entering into effect on January 01, 2019. The Note, used as reference and practical guidance 
for the conduct of arbitrators and parties in the Court, has implemented five major amendments towards 
more efficiency and transparency.96 
 
Firstly, the publication of the arbitrator’s details has expanded on including the industry sector 
involved and the counsel representing the parties in the case.97 Regarding the publication of awards, 
publicising and disseminating information about arbitration has been one of ICC’s commitments since 
its creation and an instrumental factor in facilitating the development of trade worldwide98, thus, the ICC 
has now implemented that parties and arbitrators accept that awards made as from 1 January 2019 
may be published in its entirety no less than two years after the parties were notified of a final award.99 
Nonetheless, parties remain with an option to object that publication, requesting that any award be in 
all or part anonymised or pseudonymised, and in case of a confidentiality agreement covering certain 
aspects of the arbitration or of the award, publication will be subject to the parties’ specific consent.100 
Once again, we find the importance of the principle of confidentiality on the agreement prior to the 
proceeding. Similar to the previous amendment, the Note includes about arbitrator’s disclosures 
regarding non-parties, were the Secretariat will aid in assessing whether a disclosure should be 
made.101 
 
Additionally, it is noteworthy to recall on the foreword of the ICC Arbitration Rules 2017 that state 
that the Rules are a structured, institutional framework intended to ensure transparency, efficiency and 
fairness in the dispute resolution process while allowing parties to exercise their choice over many 
aspects of procedure, and expressly stating the new policy trend to be followed as ICC arbitrations will 
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become even more transparent, for the Court will now provide reasons for a wide range of important 
decisions, if requested by one of the parties, therefore, Article 11(4) has been amended to that effect.102 
 
Moreover, even when there has been a to tendency to transparency by the ICC through the 
publication of awards, it still remains silent on the core matter of the principle of confidentiality. Even 
when the ICC Rules establish on its Article 6 that the work of the Court is of a confidential nature103, it 
is by its Appendix II – International Rules of the International Court of Arbitration, on its Article 1(4), that 
a confidential character is given to the documents submitted to the Court, or drawn up by it or the 
Secretariat in the course of the Court’s proceedings, are communicated only to the members of the 
Court and to the Secretariat and to persons authorized by the President to attend Court sessions104, 
and in its Article 1(5), it establishes that the President or the Secretary General of the Court may 
authorize researchers undertaking work of an academic nature to acquaint themselves with awards and 
other documents of general interest, with the exception of memoranda, notes, statements and 
documents remitted by the parties within the framework of arbitration proceedings.105  
 
a.2) London Court of International Arbitration 
The London Court of International Arbitration (herein after referred to as LCIA) is one of the oldest 
international arbitral institutions being established in 1892, this, it is a highly respected organisation; it 
follows its own Rules, as well as the UNCITRAL Rules.106 In 2006, it became the first leading arbitral 
body to adopt a rule requiring arbitrators to provide reasons for its decisions107, thus consolidating a 
similarity with traditional litigation in common law, establishing a concrete stare decisis, hence, a 
precedent. It most definitely has been a dramatic and important development.108 Under the LCIA 
Arbitration Rules 2014, quite contrary to the direction taken by the ICC, it is established on its Article 
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30(1) that the parties undertake as a general principle to keep confidential all awards in the arbitration, 
together with all materials in the arbitration created for the purpose of the arbitration and all other 
documents produced by another party in the proceedings not otherwise in the public domain.109 
However, it includes a brief exception for such confidentiality, up to the extent that disclosure may be 
required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right, or to enforce or challenge an award 
in legal proceedings before a state court or other legal authority.110 Remarkably, the LCIA do not publish 
any award or any part of an award without the prior written consent of all parties and the Arbitral 
Tribunal.111 Regarding the privacy of the hearings, they are on first instance private, unless the parties 
agree otherwise in writing112, meaning that the arbitration will follow what it is stipulated in the agreement 
to arbitrate. 
 
a.3) Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration  
The Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (herein after referred to as ACICA) was 
established in 1985, having its first general Rules released in 2005, and presents its most recent edition 
in 2016.113 Chiefly, the ACICA Arbitration Rules 2016 do not distinguish between domestic and 
international arbitration but are designed for the latter, and ACICA in fact only administers international 
arbitrations.114 In the same fashion as the LCIA Rules, under its Article 22(1) the ACICA Arbitration 
Rules state that unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, all hearings shall take place in private.115 
Following the posture of requiring an express term of confidentiality, the award, materials and 
documents of the proceeding shall be treated as confidential and not to be disclosed, but the existence 
of arbitration is not under the umbrella of confidentiality.116  It also presents exceptions that allow to 
disclose documents, (a) for the purpose of making an application to any competent court; (b) for the 
purpose of making an application to the courts of any State to enforce the award; (c) pursuant to the 
order of a court of competent jurisdiction; (d) if required by the law of any State which is binding on the 
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party making the disclosure; or (e) if required to do so by any regulatory body.117 In contrast to the LCIA 
Rules it is more open in the circumstances by which the veil of confidentiality may be risen, presented 
in clear scenarios.  
 
a.4) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law  
In like manner, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (herein after referred to as 
UNCITRAL) has its own set of rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010, which were revised in 2010 
to meet the needs of modern businesses; although the modification consisted in improvements to 
procedural efficiency, the inclusion of provisions on multi-party arbitrations and the development of rules 
on interim measures.118 It is not until 2013 that the UNCITRAL addressed a minor revision on 
transparency policies as it will be seen in further sections, although they apply to investment arbitrations 
based on treaties. 
 
Chiefly, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules disregard any matters on confidentiality and privacy, even 
when addressing the hearings. Although, in a brink of modernity, they allow a witnesses to be examined 
by means of telecommunication or videoconference.119 As seen in the previous section, the UNCITRAL 
also has its Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Nonetheless, it also lacks on 
addressing matters of confidentiality and privacy in a concrete and clear manner. The only relevant 
disposition besides the previous discussed, and once again in matters of the agreement to arbitrate, is 
that a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the 
invalidity of the arbitration clause, thus, permitting arbitration, to recognise or enforce the resulting 
award.120 Moreover, in Part Two of said Model Law, regarding the explanatory note by the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat, it is stated the purpose of such text, that it ‘constitutes a sound basis for the desired 
harmonization and improvement of national laws; (…) and reflects a worldwide consensus on the 
principles and important issues of international arbitration practice.’121 Furthermore, it encompasses the 
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objective of Model Law, that should be appreciated not only proper to said law, but as the ultimate goal 
of international regulation, saying in that sense that ‘the form of a model law was chosen as the vehicle 
for harmonization and modernization in view of the flexibility it gives to States in preparing new 
arbitration laws; (…) States are encouraged to make as few changes as possible when incorporating 
the Model Law into their legal systems’122. However, even when it praises to meet the needs of 
international commercial arbitration and provide a standard based on solutions acceptable to parties 
from different legal systems and attack problems that arise from the absence of specific legislation 
governing arbitration123, it clearly lacks to address a current problem that is very important on the 
international (and even national) arena, not mentioning by any degree a posture on confidentiality. 
‘Since confidentiality has not been on the agenda of the revised UNCITRAL Model Law, it is unlikely 
that the enacting countries will depart from its letter and spirit’.124 
 
Albeit the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules disregard confidentiality, the UNCITRAL Notes on 
Organizing Arbitral Proceedings 2016, a nonbinding instrument containing a model of an agreement on 
confidentiality, provides on its Note 6 that there is an inherent requirement of confidentiality in 
commercial arbitration and that confidentiality is an advantageous and helpful feature of international 
commercial arbitration; nevertheless, there is no uniform approach in domestic laws or arbitration rules 
regarding the extent to which the participants in an arbitration are under a duty to maintain the 
confidentiality of information relating to the arbitral proceedings.125  
 
a.5) International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (herein after referred to as ICSID) 
provides facilities for investment disputes and has its own set of rules, the Rules of Procedure for 
Arbitration Proceedings, which state on its Rule 15 that deliberations of the Tribunal shall take place in 
private and remain secret.126 Even when the ICSID attends to Investor State Arbitration, it serves to 
reflect the international posture, and ironically, although relevant to investor-state, perceives to be a 
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closed and conceived under secrecy. It is noteworthy the wording for the previous rule, as “secret” may 
derive into an abuse of confidentiality, even when in cases of public interest.  
 
b) Trade secrets 
In other matters, but still relevant to the principle of confidentiality, is one of the reasons why companies 
praise for an absolute confidentiality: trade or business secrets. Notably, a trade or business secret is 
a piece of information treated as confidential because its particular features and limited access lead a 
competitive advantage, as a result, it may be almost any information that has economic value and 
provides the holder with an advantage over competitors, ‘[t]hese include different types  of technical 
information (e.g. designs, drawings, architectural plans, blueprints and maps, algorithms, instructional 
methods, manufacturing or repair processes, techniques and know- how, document tracking processes, 
formulas for producing products) as well as business information (sales and distribution methods, lists 
of suppliers and clients and consumer profiles, business and advertising strategies, marketing plans, 
financial information)’.127 
 
‘The protection of business secrets is perhaps the primary purpose of a principle of 
confidentiality’.128 For this effects, the United Nations International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law (herein after referred to as UNIDROIT), included in its Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts under its Article 2.1.16 regarding the duty of confidentiality that ‘where information is given 
as confidential by one party in the course of negotiations, the other party is under a duty not to disclose 
that information or to use it improperly for its own purposes, whether or not a contract is subsequently 
concluded’129. ‘A careful balance must be struck between the legitimate interests of the parties in 
maintaining confidentiality in relation to what are often highly commercially sensitive disputes and the 
duty of the courts to administer justice fairly and transparently in open court’.130  
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Moreover, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 (TRIPS 
Agreement 1994), that was included in Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization in 1994, addresses the protection of intellectual property rights, in this case, trade 
secrets or undisclosed information, as it establishes in its Article 39, Section 2 the requirements for 
preventing from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without consent as long as such 
information is secret in the sense that it is not generally known among or readily accessible to persons 
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; has commercial value 
because it is secret; and has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances to keep it 
secret.131 In essence, even when discussing confidentiality in the documents used or produced by 
arbitration, international regulations are able to secure the protection of sensitive information, even 
when it might collide with the need for transparency.132 Therefore,  arguments against unravelling 
confidentiality in fear of disclosing sensitive business information (secrets) are not viable, as they are 
protected by Intellectual Property rights.  
 
In addition, the World Intellectual Property (herein after referred to as the WIPO) ahs its own set of 
Arbitration Rules. Within the WIPO Arbitration Rules 2014, on its Article 75 that information of the 
existence of arbitration may only be disclosed by a court challenge or an action for enforcement of an 
award, as long as required by law or competent regulatory body, but allows an exception, allowing to 
disclose the names of the parties by the purpose of satisfying any obligation of good faith or candor 
owed to a third party.133 As for the confidentiality of the documents of the proceedings, the WIPO states 
they are not to be disclosed, unless there is a consent from the parties or order of a court having 
jurisdiction.134 The awards receive similar treatment, confidential unless the parties consent or in case 
of an action before a national court or competent authority., with the purpose to comply with a legal 
requirement or to protect a party’s legal rights against a third party.135 
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c) National legislation 
Up until now, it may be appreciated from these rules that principles of arbitration, specifically privacy (of 
hearings) and confidentiality (of documents) are flexible and include a strong sense in favour of party 
autonomy, as always leaving up to the parties to agree on confidential and private matters, hence, 
arbitration rests upon a complete and strong freedom of contract. In essence, confidentiality has been 
seen as a mere convenience of privacy, not grounded in any legal right or obligation.136 Equally 
important, it may be deducted that international regulation, even that from institutions, do not effectively 
tackle the problem of the current debate. In this sense, it is important to look into the landmark cases 
and national law that have in some way or another, been the basis and precedent for the two main 
opinions whether the duty of confidentiality is an implied duty or express one.  In general terms, English 
jurisprudence recognises the implicit obligation of maintaining confidentiality regarding the procedures 
and documents in connection with an arbitral proceeding, whilst Australia, adopted a different tendency, 
denying the existence of an implicit obligation of maintaining the confidentiality.137  
 
c.1) England 
As for England, going in the same direction and presence it has had in international trade, as Roy 
Goode states that it is no small feature that London can now fairly claim to be the world’s leading 
financial centre138, it has been setting course in matters of arbitration, starting by the creation of the 
Arbitration Act of 1698, under the guidance of John Locke, was accepted by the parliament and entered 
into force, under a method of exclusion of unnecessary legal constraints and difficulties.139 As any other 
legislation, it has gone through reforms in order to adapt to the needs of the community, thus, the current 
version is the Arbitration Act of 1996. Nonetheless said Act, as well as the majority of other national 
legislations, does not contain provisions on the private nature of arbitration nor on confidentiality.140 
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Said Act not only remains silent on the matter, but also is that so by a deliberate manner as the 
conception at the time (and still up-to-date) was that confidentiality and privacy were unsettled and will 
be better left evolve with common law.141 The omission was discussed in the Department Advisory 
Committee, which concluded that the courts should be left to continue to works out its implications on 
a pragmatic case by case basis.142  
 
Therefore, the main source of law rests in case law. ‘Case law shows that questions of privilege 
and confidentiality can be a legal minefield in contentious proceedings at national level and even more 
so in international proceedings’.143 The English vision on confidentiality lays on the principle that 
‘disputes that arise under private contracts are private matters’144, and on the privacy element, as parties 
‘enter into these contracts [arbitration agreement] with the express view of keeping their quarrels from 
the public eyes, and of avoiding that discussion in public’145, thus, highlighting consideration of privacy 
the same as confidentiality. ‘Commercial arbitrations that take place in London are automatically 
concealed behind a curtain of secrecy’.146 Accordingly, the Civil Procedure Rules state on its Rule 
62.10(3)(b) that hearings will be heard in private, meaning that third parties are not entitled to attend to 
such, as it has been agreed only to be discussed between the involved.147 Rather than to be codified, 
English law relays on common law. The case Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel v Stuart J Mew l [1993] 
mentioned that ‘if the parties to an English law contract refer their disputes to arbitration they are entitled 
to assume at the least the hearing will be conducted in private, (…) it is an advantage of arbitration, (…) 
it is an essential ingredient of arbitration’148, which as we now of the posture of England, it was extended 
to refer all documents as private. However, this same case held that confidentiality was not absolute.  
 
Then again, the English posture is on an implied confidentiality, and ‘unless parties expressly agree 
in writing to the contrary, the parties undertake as a general principle to keep confidential all awards, 
together with all materials in the arbitration created for the purpose of the arbitration and all other 
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documents produced by another party in the proceedings’149. It recognises only the exception to 
disclose if ‘required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right, or to enforce or challenge 
an award in legal proceedings before a state court or other legal authority’.150 
 
Notwithstanding the above, it has become more evident in recent cases that English law is starting 
to break its rigid mould on the posture of absolute confidentiality, precisely as seen in John Forster 
Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2008], as some documents from the arbitration procedure 
may be disclosed. The issue that is now presented, is the extent by which confidentiality exists and 
functions. ‘The current trend in international arbitration is to diminish, or at least question, the 
confidentiality of arbitral proceedings as a whole’.151 Correspondingly, the current position in English 
law was pronounced by the Court of Appeal in John Forster Emmott v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd 
[2008], revolutionising the course of arbitration, allowing exceptions to confidentiality, placing limits and 
not as an absolute. There are a range of circumstances in which a party may wish to disclose, or is 
compelled to disclose information or documents that were created or produced as part of an arbitration, 
such as other arbitration or litigation proceedings, for corporate or regulatory purposes, to interested 
groups, or for public interest.152 This case took as precedent the Ali Shipping Corporation v Shipyard 
Trogir [1999], where it was mentioned that confidentiality was subject to the exceptions of disclosure 
for the protection of the legitimate interests of an arbitrating party or to defend a claim or counterclaim 
brought by the third party.153 Even when such case was not as progressive in defining confidentiality, 
as it still made the assumption it was derived from privacy hearings. ‘Ali Shipping confirmed the old 
English confidentiality but introduced a clear set of exceptions, applicable to all types of materials 
created, used or produced in arbitration’.154 The exceptions presented consisted in consent by the 
parties, court order, leave of the court, and for the protection of legitimate interests of the parties.155  
 
It is noteworthy that the cases aforementioned presented an analogy with the case Tournier v 
National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924], whose approach was a landmark in the banker’s 
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duty of confidentiality, declaring said duty not as an absolute for as a subject of exception, enlisting the 
four principal scenarios when a bank can legally disclose information about its customer: compulsion 
of law, public interest, interest of the bank, and consent from the customer.156 Applied into confidentiality 
in arbitration, disclosure is to be allowed when, apart from where the parties consent, there is an order, 
it is reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interest of an arbitrating party, where the 
interests of justice require disclosure, and/or where the public interest so requires.157   
 
As for the Emmott case, the exception to be applied is in the interest of justice ‘so the foreign courts 
would not be misled or potentially misled where the cases that were being advanced in the various 
proceedings were essentially raising the same or similar allegations, (…) the interests of justice 
exception arises not as an exception to the implied duty, but as the basis for a court hearing a 
subsequent dispute to order that information be disclosed notwithstanding confidence’.158 Nevertheless, 
it was declared that the documents requested to be disclosed were not commercially sensible. 
Moreover, Lord Justice Lawrence Collins mentioned an important point that recalls once more to 
Tournier, regarding how confidentiality is confused or dignified by secrecy, as he emphasizes the usage 
of the duty as a cloak, ensuring it shall not be used for those objectives in misleading. This is important 
to keep at mind, as it is this sense of “cloak of confidentiality” or “secrecy” that have a negative 
connotation, misleading, and posing a threat for transparency and open justice. Equally important, it 
was held that the interests of justice were not confined to the interests of justice in England.159 
In summary, Emmott declared a difference on the concepts of confidentiality and privacy, and 
marked confidentiality in documents only when in cases of containing trade secrets. Above all, it placed 
the exceptions to confidentiality are as follows: (a) disclosure by consent, (b) by public interest or (c) in 
the interest of justice.  
 
Attending the heart of English law, the freedom of contract, it is important to mention that if the 
parties expressly agree on the arbitration agreement, including a clause for non-disclosure, in case of 
a breach (of contract/of confidentiality), there will be rights for damages.  Nevertheless, courts have not 
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yet ventured to treat breach of confidentiality in arbitration, and neither has legislation concretely 
addressed the situation.160,161 Ultimately, ‘there is very little case law addressing the issue of sanctions 
for breach of a confidentiality duty’162. 
 
Correspondingly, Lord Justice Gross, from the Court of Appeal, expressed his opinions regarding 
the Courts and London arbitration, stating that they both are complementary and mutually reinforcing, 
as it has been seen, case law is of ultimate importance and acts as the main source of law163.164 
‘Conceptually, arbitration is respected and thrives in this jurisdiction as a matter of party autonomy and 
choice, within a tolerant and light touch statutory supervisory regime, stemming from the Arbitration Act 
1996, (…) [in summary, it follows a principle of] “Maximum support. Minimum interference”’.165 Even 
when the Arbitral Act of 1996 remains silent on matters of confidentiality, it establishes on its Section 
69 regarding an appeals on point of law, where unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral 
proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question 
of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings.166 This brings up the question on the posture 
of England regarding the principle of confidentiality, even when it is prised on the aforementioned cases 
a duty of implied confidentiality (implied term), it has an answer for the appeal of awards, an instance 
that calls upon disclosure and the unravelling of secrecy. This posture is ad-hoc to the way English law 
has its root on case law, always having the Courts as a superior, even when in arbitration, recalling its 
innovative essence from the beginning of the evolution of commerce, English law is one step ahead 
and imposing. Nonetheless, it obviously has its own limits, requesting the agreement of all the other 
parties to the proceedings, once it has exhausted any available arbitral process of appeal or review, or 
with the leave of the court, within the 28 days of the date of the award or of notification of the result of 
arbitral appeal or review.167 Regarding the leave to appeal, it is reserved for when the determination of 
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the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties, the question was to be 
determined by the tribunal, thus, the decision of the tribunal is obviously wrong, or the question is one 
of general public importance and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and that, 
despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all the 
circumstances for the court to determine the question.168 Additionally, we may observe the exceptions 
that are commented on the Emmott case, regarding public interest, besides the compulsion of law.  
 
In other matters, the same Arbitration Act even challenges the privacy of the hearings on its Section 
21, where it allows an umpire to attend the proceedings if agreed by the parties; in a full flourishing of 
party autonomy, and a concrete posture of English law ruled by the freedom of contract, all above other 
international rules.169 In light of the above, it is noteworthy to state that even if the Act itself remains 
silent on confidentiality, in one way or another, allows exceptions for such. Similar to the Arbitration Act, 
the ACICA Arbitration Rules 2016 allow a joinder upon request by a party or third party.170 Granted that, 
‘a flow of important commercial cases continues to find their way to the courts via appeals from 
arbitration proceedings’171.   
 
As a side note, Lord Justice Gross said that there has been uniform construction of standard largely 
through decisions of the courts upon special cases stated by arbitrators, resulting in a comprehensive 
and certain English commercial law.172 Notwithstanding the latter, as seen by the discussion of the 
recent cases, there is still no uniformity in the approach to the principle of confidentiality. In summary, 
the English approach has been, albeit some exceptions, that ‘all documents created for or in the 
arbitration or disclosed for the purpose of the arbitration are presumptively subject to an obligation of 
confidentiality’173. It has been said the the English approach to confidentiality has met with little 
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sympathy elsewhere, therefore, it has been argued that parties should attain to express, rather than 
implied, obligations of confidentiality.174 
 
c.2) Australia  
By contrast, Australia do not follow the concept of implied confidentiality, rather follows a posture that 
requires an express duty within the agreement to arbitrate, hence apprising confidentiality and privacy 
as two different elements. In essence, even when national legislation does not tackle confidentiality, the 
High Court of Australia through case law has declared that there is no general rule of confidentiality 
except that there is a rule of privacy in arbitration hearings.175 The case that gave its essence to this 
posture, the Esso Australia Resources Ltd v The Honorable Sidney James Plowman [1955], it is said it 
‘crashed like a giant wave-a veritable Australian tsunami-on the shores of jurisdictions around the 
world’176.  
 
But not only has been case law that addressed the matter, but Australia has recently updated 
its International Arbitration Act 1974, which adopts the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration and the New York Convention 1954, introducing an opt-in basis, requiring 
parties to agree to be bound to the obligation not to disclose information.177 In other words, the Act 
follows the case law criterion to require an express duty of confidentiality within the agreement to 
arbitrate. Notwithstanding the above, in 2015 the Statute Law Revision Act (No.2) 2015 ‘reversed the 
onus, instead requiring parties to opt out of the provisions by agreement’178. However, the idea that 
there must be an express agreement to decide over said duty. The most recent amendment was 
compiled and entered into force on 26 October 2018. Moreover, the International Arbitration Act 1974, 
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clearly includes the circumstances by which confidential information may be disclosed. On its Section 
23D it states that the information may be disclosed with the consent of all of the parties involved and 
automatically (with previous consent) to a professional or other adviser of any of the parties179.  
 
Furthermore, it includes the following scenarios to disclose information necessary: (a) to ensure 
that a party has a full opportunity to present the party’s case, (b) for the establishment or protection of 
the legal rights of a party in relation to a third party, (c) for the purpose of enforcing an arbitral award, 
(d) exercising a power under Article 35 of the Model Law, as in force under subsection 16(1) of this Act, 
to recognise or enforce an arbitral award, (e) if the disclosure is in accordance with an order made or a 
subpoena issued by a court, (f) if the disclosure is authorised or required by another relevant law, or 
required by a competent regulatory body, as long ad there is a written details given to the parties with 
an explanation of reasons for the disclosure.180 In addition, the Tribunal may also allow disclosure when 
upon request of one of the parties after giving each of the parties the opportunity to be heard.181 
However, a Court may prohibit disclosure if satisfied in the circumstances of the particular case that the 
public interest in preserving the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings is not outweighed by other 
considerations that render it desirable in the public interest for the information to be disclosed, or if the 
disclosure is more than is reasonable for that purpose.182 
 
 
c.3) Mexico  
As a consequence of an increasing popularity in the use of arbitration, a number of countries ‘from 
traditionally “difficult” areas for arbitration such as Latin America and the Arab World have ratified the 
New York Convention and taken a more positive approach to international commercial arbitration’183.  
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‘Latin American countries, traditionally hostile to arbitration are now embarking on a process of 
legislative modernization’.184 Therefore, there has been a tendency to a further diversity and a 
development of harmonising the international arbitration environment.185  
 
In Mexico, being a civil law jurisdiction, has its source law of commercial arbitration codified 
mainly in the Code of Commerce, but it was not up until 1989 that a special title on the matter was 
included, by the Decree by which diverse dispositions of the Code of Commerce are reformed186, added 
and derogated issued by the Congress of the Union (legislative branch) in January 04, 1989, and 
followed by another reform in 1993, containing provisions based on the UNCITRAL Model Law and ICC 
Arbitration Rules, with the aim of bringing the country’s law more into line with that of Mexico’s trade 
partners.187 In this sense, it is interesting to take notice on the economic nature of Mexico, which main 
economic activity consists on exportation. Notably, the introduction to arbitral proceedings came quite 
late into Mexican legislation, and even when the introduction came afterwards the beginning of the 
debate on confidentiality, Mexican legislation has ever since remained silent on the matter.  
 
On an interesting note, legislation in Mexico places arbitration very close to the courts, as it 
establishes on its Article 1424 of the Code of Commerce that: the judge to whom a dispute is submitted 
on an issue that is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall refer the parties to arbitration at the time 
any of them requests it, unless it is verified that said agreement is null, ineffective or impossible to 
execute188. Nonetheless, it does not include any scenarios by which and arbitral proceeding or award 
would result in a state court. And in its Article 1425 establishes that even if there is an arbitration 
agreement, the parties may, prior to the arbitration proceedings or during its course, request to a judge 
to adopt precautionary measures provisional.189 Moreover, for the enforcement of arbitral awards, it 
disposes that by writing request to the state judge, it will be enforced. Most importantly, it does not 
include any provision on the duty of confidentiality, but it may be reflected that for matters of compulsion 
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of law it tis none existent.  As for other rules from Mexican origin, the Arbitration Center of Mexico190 
provides its own rules, the CAM191 Rules of Arbitration 2009. In matters of confidentiality, the CAM 
Rules of Arbitration 2009 establishes on its Article 5 that under no circumstances shall the divulgation 
of the writings, notes, communications and other documents presented by the parties during the 
arbitration proceedings be authorized, and it even goes to the extreme to declare that documents may 
be destroyed in a time limit of one year counting since the ending of the proceeding.192  This last 
disposition is quite alarming, and it also goes in line with some of the risks of confidentiality, specially 
in a country like Mexico, were there is a tendency to corruption. As it is going to be discussed in further 
sections, bribery and corruption are a side effet to the cloak of secrecy. There is a general sense that 
authorities are not honest, and are very likely to accept money to rule in favour of party. With this in 
mind, investor-state arbitration is not a viable option to solve disputes. 
 
Chiefly, Mexico is young on adopting commercial arbitration, thus, lacks of a concrete 
framework. Nonetheless, being a young legislation may have its advantage, specially in this times of 
shifting criteria, were Mexico could easily adopt the new tendency towards transparency, and most 
importantly, have a single and uniform codification. This will also strengthen Mexico as a a new prospect 
for international commercial arbitration and popularise as a place to engage to solve disputes. Elevate 
Mexico to the international standards and tacking the modern needs of traders, an important step that 
will fortify its economy directed to foreign investment and exportation.  
 
d) Final remarks 
In essence, regulations both international and national are rather ambiguous on matters of 
confidentiality. Nonetheless, it may be concluded that they almost all recognise privacy within the scope 
of hearings only, and the confusion and different postures star when talking about the duty of 
confidentiality. England and Australia, bot common law jurisdictions, have opposing postures, the 
former being in favour of an implied duty, whilst the latter requests an express term. Most definitely, 
Australia is the most advanced on listing concrete exceptions to confidentiality, as well, as quite 
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permissive and in a direction to protect the parties’ rights. Nonetheless, it is evident from recent case 
law, that England is shifting its posture and allowing exceptions to the duty in question. And as for 
Mexico, the problems of not having a uniform set of rules is evident, and most importantly, the risks of 
confidentiality that lead to secrecy, therefore, bribery and corruption. Notwithstanding this, there have 
also been case that shed light into the confidentiality issue on disclosing documents, and it is slowly 
shifting a posture to allowing certain limits or exceptions to said duty.  
 
Chapter III – Exceptions to the principle of confidentiality   
As explored within the national and international legislations, although slow and not uniform, there 
has been building criteria as to what is the scope of the duty of confidentiality, meaning their limitations 
and/or exceptions. On the initial debate, it was questioned whether confidentiality was a implied or 
express term within the agreement to arbitrate (which has been defined as the angular stone of 
arbitration). But it has been through practice, specifically case law, that exceptions have been marked, 
which have permed into some regulations. This, motivated by the confusion of confidentiality as 
secrecy, which as many scholars have agreed, poses more dangers than benefits to parties involved, 
and ever more in this modern times, with and agenda to move towards transparency and openness. 
Nonetheless, the exceptions have their origin in practical measures, and most importantly, in the 
protection of the rights of the parties involved in the arbitration. For purposes of this section, said 
exceptions will be explored.  
 
Albeit there are widely different approaches to understanding confidentiality in commercial 
arbitration, most jurisdictions ultimately recognize that what is initially confidential between parties may 
not be protected from disclosure or treated as confidential by the courts in further litigation.193 
 
Recalling the Emmot case, disclosure in the interest of justice may include’ avoiding contradictory 
evidence, such as when witnesses appear to give materially different testimony in court than they did 
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in prior proceedings’194. Additionally, as there is tendency to disclosure resulted from exceptions, 
confidentiality is more difficult to preserve when one of the parties seeks to raise challenges or enforce 
the arbitral award.195 
 
Markedly, there are other exceptions that require the lifting of the veil of secrecy, even when not 
concretely implied as to attempt against confidentiality. As previously discusses, companies are often 
obliged to report to shareholders, make disclosures in their annual accounts and reports and otherwise 
announce significant information to the market, specially in the case of publicly listed companies, with 
the objective to ensure financial integrity. ‘Listed companies are subject to disclosure obligations which 
arise from a combination of rules and regulations enshrined in legislation or issued by regulatory 
authorities, as well as guidelines issued by such regulatory authorities as to the interpretation of such 
binding obligations’.196 
 
Additionally, there exists within business practice a disclosure between companies with auditors, 
banks, insurance companies, shareholders, and investors, even to an extent to report the amount in 
the dispute.197 Nonetheless, this has not been part of the revolving issue, as it is generally accepted 
that this are reasons to disclose about arbitration, but anyways, reflects that modern times cannot 
function under a veil or cloak of secrecy.  
 
Chapter IV – Arbitration under a cloak of secrecy  
As almost everything in life, the dose makes the poison, thus, an excessive confidentiality has its own 
risks. Currently, arbitration is generally designed to offer the promise of secrecy, ‘under the large 
umbrella of the party autonomy principle, the power to control who may have knowledge’198. In 
accordance with the Latin saying aliud est tacere, aliud celare, that means to conceal is one thing, to 
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be silent another,199 it acquires important relevance in arbitration were confidentiality is often presumed 
as secrecy. For this section, the risks that emanate from too much confidentiality, or for effects of better 
understanding, secrecy, will be addressed. Indeed, the principle of confidentiality has given arbitration 
a sense of a curtain or cloak of secrecy. And regarding the publication of awards, since they ‘remain 
non-public, international commercial arbitration assumes the everyday risk of having to deal with diverse 
decisions rendered for similar conflicts’200. If confidentiality is treated as a barrier, more illustrative as a 
cloak, there are various effects, not only for the parties involved, but to the system as a whole and the 
very arbitrators.  
 
As for the effects for the system as a whole, the most important risk is that arbitral decisions may 
not contribute to jurisprudence. This is often compared to the the publication of legal settlements which 
constitutes a fundamental part of Law, such as jurisprudence, and brings up the question as to why is 
it not the same case with arbitral decisions and why prevent jurisprudence benefiting from the awards.201 
‘To condemn arbitral decisions to oblivion (very often of great juridical content) would imply leaving 
important doctrinal reflections that would shed great light on future cases in limbo’.202 Moreover, the 
principle of confidentiality may produce inconsistent resolutions of disputes arising out of the same 
transaction as complex international business transactions often produce multiple disputes involving 
several parties, and since they are not all bound by the same arbitration clause, two or more arbitrations 
may arise out of the same facts, resulting in the same dispute may be resolved in inconsistent ways.203 
 
‘Under conditions of increased globalization, corruption appears as a source of disruption if the 
natural laws of free trade, the medium for greater liberal expansion’.204 As previously discuses in the 
Mexican case, corruption and bribery is a true and real problem that is faced by arbitration. However, 
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even when the agreement to arbitrate has the principle of turpitudo omnia corrumpit, meaning that 
contracts like this cannot be entered into in the expectation that they are legally valid and can be 
enforced by legal process.205 ‘Bribery (…)has become almost synonymous with international 
transparency efforts’.206 ‘Unlike pollution or human rights abuses, which are separately verifiable and 
relatively public, bribery is a secret offense and a re-occurring problem in large international commercial 
contract settings’.207 On the other hand, there are cases were corporate counsel receive bad advice 
and ‘may be tempted to use arbitration as a way to justify their own mistakes or delay the moment when 
those mistakes will come to light’208, clearly recurring to arbitration as a cloak of secrecy.  
 
Not only there exists a risk within parties of the secrecy or arbitration, taking into consideration that 
they lack of sufficient knowledge to choose their arbitrator (and impose a risk in the challenge of such), 
but there is also a risk within the arbitration itself in regards with the performance of their functions. As 
an illustration, there is a risk of seeing confidentiality as an instrument to mask incorrect or unethical 
decisions, ‘arming the arbitrators with a shield that has the effect of making it impossible to review the 
merits of the award’.209 As for practitioners (the lawyers themselves) this could also lead to extra-legal 
activities, such as tax fraud and agreements contravening free competition.210  
Chapter V – Shifting into transparency: A modern approach  
As it has been discussed in previous sections, as commerce evolves, companies and enterprises have 
new and modern needs that must be satisfied by the International Commercial Arbitration system. In 
this millennium, new challenges come from new ways of doing business, and with a new wave of 
practitioners and scholars, the arbitration system is in much need for reform, actualisation and 
modernisation. This section seeks to explore the modern approach that is shifting into transparency, 
highlighting its need.  
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Previously, the private character of arbitration regarding hearings, was permed into confidentiality, 
creating an environment were abuse led to a cloak of secrecy. Now, as the veil is being lifted, and in 
accordance with the new global challenges, there is widespread conception of two different elements 
in arbitration, privacy and confidentiality, were the former is no longer a threat and has its own 
limitations, thus, the system is shifting into transparency. It is true that the pressure is increasing as the 
world turns into an open justice system hailed by transparency. Not only that, but there is an ‘increasing 
number of voluntary and involuntary disclosures that invite to consider transparency reforms, to make 
information available and the process more transparent for the benefit of the arbitral community as a 
whole’211. ‘The global demand for information and the new media technologies have reached arbitration, 
and, in information-rich times, the processes are becoming more and more accessible and hence less 
difficult to keep confidential’.212 The policies towards transparency lead to the acceptance and 
understanding of the arbitration system as a whole.  
 
Transparency allows an openness and access of information, and as seen in national judicial 
systems, ‘justice must not just be done, but has to be seen to be done’213. ‘Commercial law has evolved 
from the needs and practices of the mercantile community’214, thus new legal principles have arose. 
‘The global demand for information and the new media technologies have reached arbitration’215, and, 
in information-rich times, the processes are becoming more and more accessible and hence less 
difficult to keep confidential. 
 
With this in mind, the courts and arbitration centres have had to engage with new criteria to 
overcome the litis that arise from new mercantile ways. Moreover, ‘the global demand for information 
and the new media technologies have reached arbitration and have brought in a new perspective, which 
have caused (…) a disconnect between the presumption of confidentiality and the frequent realities of 
disclosure and publicity’216. Furthermore, this global demand also finds its origin in the recent 
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development in international practice of ‘self-governing duty of good faith, binding upon potential sellers 
and buyers of shares at pre contractual stage’.217 In other words, potential trade partners often offer 
complete disclosure as part of the due diligence procedures needed for the negotiations for a purchase. 
 
As for England, in words of Lord Justice Gross, ‘in keeping with the well-deserved reputation of the 
Commercial Court for reform of its own procedures, the Business and Property Courts [derived from a 
structural reform based on innovation and specialisation of judges] are grappling with the problems of 
disclosure in a digital age and are, in my view rightly, pursuing cultural change, in keeping with market 
demand’218. In this sense, England is questioning if the posture of implied confidentiality and the sense 
of cloak of secrecy is still acceptable in a modern world in which transparency is prised as and end in 
itself.219 
 
Consequently, the Law Commission of England and Wales is contemplating to include on its 
Thirteenth Law Reform Programme to reform the Arbitration Act 1996, as it currently fails to address 
the issue of the principle of confidentiality.220 The Commission is motivated to make this reform as they 
have the objective to preserve United Kingdom’s position as international dispute resolut ion centre.221 
‘The preparedness and ability to embrace technological change (a necessary part of the Reform 
programme) will likewise keep the courts up to speed, as new ideas such as “blockchain” and “fintech” 
introduce the potential for major changes in various markets’.222 
 
Correspondingly, the publication of the award has also been part of the debate of confidentiality, 
and thus, find the greatest acceptance within institutional arbitration. This goes in line whit the recent 
calls for transparency, and it has been said that the publication of awards is one of the most significant 
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ways to achieve this.223 In this sense, some arguments in favour of the publication of the award are the 
development of law, certainty and predictability, consistency, legitimacy, and neutrality. ‘It appears 
therefore that the current trend is to allow more transparency for arbitral awards, albeit without revealing 
the identity of the parties or other identifying details’.224 ‘It is important to underline that confidentiality is 
not breached by the publication of the reasons for an award on an anonymous basis’.225 Rather, the 
publication of awards lead arbitration users and practitioners have access to the rules applied and the 
decisions reached in order to promote the understanding on the system and help build certainty.226 
Therefore, the “lifting of the veil” contributes to the predictability of results, and the codification of usages 
by a professional organization will very often be the result of the publication of such decisions.227  
 
Indeed, as seen in the previous section, leaving awards to oblivion affect the building of valuable 
content and precedent. The insight of arbitrators is extremely valuable and even sometimes creates 
procedural and substantive rules, just as in judges in case law, producing a precedent to be followed in 
the future. 228 ‘The publication of arbitral awards can therefore contribute to the uniform and autonomous 
development of international arbitration law, as well as the lex mercatoria’.229  
Most notably, awards are binding, similar to the principle applicable to decisions of court, in 
personam, which inly operates as estoppel in favour of or against parties and those claiming through 
them, but not in favour or against third parties or strangers.230 In this sense, it is clear how the publication 
of awards will help concrete the certainty and predictability element in arbitration, ad moreover, will 
conduce to an effective enforcement of awards. As there is an increase in foreseeability of outcomes, 
it will also help the parties decide beforehand if arbitration is the best course they should follow, as well, 
as get to know the expectations of the proceeding and the arbitrator itself.231  
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 Transparency policies shift the system into openness, granting ‘access to a database of arbitral 
jurisprudence that can generate predictability and consistency, (…) to have the certainty that their 
arbitral proceeding was a fair one, even in loosing cases’232.  Not only that, but it be useful for the 
purpose of training current and future arbitrators and practitioners, enhancing the system and being 
closer to a true uniform mechanism.  
 
Likewise, the UNCITRAL created a system for collecting and disseminating information regarding 
court decisions and arbitral awards related to their works, such as their Model Laws, specifically relevant 
to this paper, the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration; such system is called Case Law 
on UNCITRAL texts, or referred to as CLOUT233. 
 
As it is indicated on the CLOUT User Guide 2010, the purpose of the system is to promote 
international awareness of legal texts, to enable judges, arbitrators, lawyers, parties to commercial 
transactions and other interested persons to take decisions and awards relating to those texts into 
account in dealing with matters within their responsibilities and to promote the uniform interpretation 
and application of those texts.234 The system is fed by national correspondents from States that have 
enacted legislation based on a Model Law, whom will collect arbitral awards and prepare abstract of 
such and are then published by the UNCITRAL Secretariat.235 On Article 11 of the CLOUT User Guide, 
it is stated that ‘the complete court decision or arbitral award, in its original language, should be 
forwarded to the Secretariat, [i]n exceptional cases, however, a certain portion of a decision or arbitral 
award may be omitted for reasons, for example, of confidentiality (in such cases an abridged decision 
or arbitral award might be provided to the Secretariat) or because the portion omitted is not relevant to 
an UNCITRAL text, or because the portion is not available to the national correspondent’236.  
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Notwithstanding the above, there are still some groups that believe the publication of the awards, 
and in general, tend towards transparency, will give way to the erosion of arbitration, a threat to business 
secrets and impact negatively on the parties’ reputation. 237 First of all, as seen on the first section of 
the present paper, confidentiality is no longer the top priority for companies engaging in arbitration, also, 
there are multiple benefits, not only for the parties but for the system, to allow the publication of awards. 
As for the business and trade secrets, lifting the veil of confidentiality poses no threat to them, as it is 
not the purpose, but rather protect and validate the rights of the parties and result in an effective 
enforcement of the arbitral decision. There is still protection to this sensible information as part of the 
intellectual property rights. And lastly, the impact on parties’ reputation is not a viable argument on the 
debate of transparency. Currently, companies are trying to meet the demands of an ever more 
challenging sector of consumers, whom ask for openness, besides, not only consumers motivate this 
openness, but also the growth of trade itself, as new trade partners and auditors ask form disclosure 
fro proper due diligence, and banks do as well when companies are trying to find funding and finance 
options. As for the parties’ reputation, in an ever more mediatic world, companies shall not conceal their 
activities.  
 
Furthermore, policies towards transparency include the possibility of evaluation of the arbitrators 
and arbitral institutions, in order to secure competence and professionalism.238 This is of fair importance, 
specially taking into consideration the previous risk discussed regarding bribery to the arbitrators and 
corruption.  
 
On the other hand, and even if not in scope within the present paper, Investor-State Arbitration has 
found the demands of increased transparency based on public interest in a more proactive manner, 
and thus, have initiated and applied more transparency policies. Nonetheless, in this modern times, 
commercial arbitration is assimilating the same transition. Also, ‘given the vigor of pressures for 
increased transparency in investment arbitration, it seems doubtful that they will stop at the blurred 
boundary between the two systems’239. 
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 In light of the above, the UNCITRAL has been pushing on policies towards transparency, even 
considering whether hearings should be opened to the public, clearly rebelling against the hallmark 
principle of arbitration: privacy of the hearings, thus in 2014 it introduced its Rules on Transparency, 
and although they are directed to Investor-State Arbitration, its impact has led to appeals for greater 
transparency in international commercial arbitration.240 It is argued that since commercial arbitrations 
can also affect the policy making of a state on issues such as power generation, water, or infrastructure 
since companies play a major role in the provision of such facilities, sooner or later, these rules will also 
be applicable to commercial arbitrations, and even more so, in cases of arbitrations of pharmaceutical 
companies.241 Highlighting the importance of companies, it was reflected by the global financial crisis 
of 2008 as multinational corporations had an impact on policy making and public finances.242  
 
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Working Group II on Arbitration and Conciliation have discussed 
the possible content of a legal standard to be prepared on transparency with a general agreement that 
the substantive issues will be publicity regarding the initiation of arbitral proceedings; documents to be 
published (such as pleadings, procedural orders, supporting evidence); submissions by third parties 
(“amicus curiae”) in proceedings; public hearings; publication of arbitral awards; possible exceptions to 
the transparency rules; and repository of published information.243 In light of the above, the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency 2014 includes a listing of the documents to be made public and that hearings 
shall be public.244  
 
Chapter VI – Conclusion  
Indeed, there is an increasing popularity to use arbitration amongst companies, and understanding the 
international complexity of transactions, it it of no surprise that they choose this dispute settlement 
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mechanism as it meets the needs of neutrality and effectiveness when it comes to disputes between 
parties from different jurisdictions, and hence, secure the binding and enforcement of the award.  
 
All things considered, the contractual nature of arbitration, following the principles of freedom 
of contract and party autonomy, are of ultimate importance to understand the duties that are going to 
derive from such agreement, as they set the base as how confidentiality is going to be addressed. As 
it was seen, there were two main postures regarding this duty within the agreement: as an implied term 
or express one.  
 
Historically speaking, confidentiality was used as a synonym of privacy, concealing under what 
is know as the cloak or veil of secrecy any information and/or document, even the mere existence of an 
arbitral proceeding, in other words, the tradition was that the duty of confidentiality was an implied term. 
Nonetheless, this secrecy poses risks to the arbitration system itself, and tampering into misleading 
proceedings. Equally important, the difference of privacy and confidentiality shall be recognised and 
portrayed in the relevant regulations.  
 
By consequence, an approach directed into transparency, as reflected by recent case law and 
reforms in national and international regulations. In essence, publicity is the very soul of justice as it is 
the keenest spur to exertion, and the surest of all guards against improbity.245 
 
It also important to keep in mind that this demands are to be growing more and more as the 
role of private companies are more than ever present on public matters, as their actions have a vigorous 
impact on consumers, under a banner of good corporate governance. As an illustration, pharmaceutical 
companies. This also goes in hand with the even more active demands from Investor-State Arbitration, 
which have a more direct impact on public interest. Nonetheless, there is a point where this demands 
will converge into only one and thus reform will be over arbitration as a whole. This pressure and change 
in doing business has been motivated by the increased used of technology and media, were openness 
and information are staples.  
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In general terms, there are three main instances that may touch upon a duty of confidentiality. 
Firstly, hearings, although it has been concluded that this element is solely particular to the hearings of 
the proceedings, and do not perm into the documents produced, the award, or any instance that occurs 
afterwards the proceeding. Whilst confidentiality is present in the process of disclosure of the 
documents afterwards the proceeding and in the publication of the awards. The confidential status of 
the documents, as explored on the present paper are quite a turmoil in the current debates. Shifting 
from an absolute veil of secrecy, were all was presumed confidential, is shifting into allowing exceptions. 
In essence, there is a limit to the principle of confidentiality and these limitations are making its way into 
regulations and apply in practice.  
 
Markedly, derived from the debate on what is actually confidentiality within arbitration, slowly 
but surely, a set of concrete exceptions that delimit the scope of said duty have been recognised. In 
essence these exceptions are as as follows: (a) disclosure by consent, (b) by public interest or (c) in 
the interest of justice. Furthermore, there are other case were there is a generally accepted disclosure: 
to comply with obligations with shareholders, auditors, banks and/or trade partners, basically due 
diligences. As for awards, institutional arbitration has been the main proposer on the matter, gaining a 
general acceptance.  
 
As for England, it is evident that the decision made in Emmott mark the new direction of a more 
progressive English law on matter of confidentiality, following the trend in case law since 1993, more 
directed into the Australian point of view. Whilst Australia’s regulations and centre of arbitration are the 
most advanced on enlisting the concrete exceptions, or when it is allowed to disclose information and/or 
documents. Definitely, nations that used to be perceived as hostile for arbitration, still have a lot to learn 
from the current shift into transparency. Specially a country like Mexico which even goes into an extreme 
on the CAM Arbitration Rules to allow destruction of documents. When nations like England and 
Australia, which are major centres of arbitration, find ingrained postures on the matter, it is time to look 
to the younger nations (arbitration-wise) to seek a true change in the system. This is why, the most 
optimal approach to this matter, is that firstly, international regulations (as they have been doing) speak 
out load about the duty of confidentiality, no more ambiguity. From there, taking into consideration the 
modern needs of the world, the best approach will be to follow Australia’s guidance on having clear and 
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concrete exceptions listed, always in favour to protect the parties’ rights. Finally, form companies, it is 
advised to review their arbitration agreements and verify their confidentiality clause. It is noteworthy that 
trade secrets are to be protected by intellectual property rights, so there shall be no fear from companies 
to adapt into the transparency policies, and for authorities to limit the scope of confidentiality.  
 
Certainly, this is a matter of balance. As seen as proposed solutions, a point where confidentiality 
and transparency are met halfway. Confidentiality cannot be completely disposed, at it may risk the 
parties, but keeping this secrecy, also has negative effects. These elements are not meant to be 
absolutes, but to find a comprehensive functioning under the demands of the new world.  
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